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PRIVACY COMMITMENTS
Rachel Wilka*
Abstract: What responsibilities do corporations have with regard to their consumers’
information? Many articles have looked at ways to make personal information the “property”
of the consumer. Property approaches attempt to overlay personal information on the legal
frameworks of trade secret, trademark, and copyright law. While each approach has its
merits, and contributes to the field, none of the proposals generate a concrete way for a
consumer to enforce his or her rights against a company. The proposals all suffer from the
same fatal flaw, a new system must not just create a consumer right but also balance the
inequities in bargaining power between a consumer and a large corporation.
In patent law, there are similar conflicts of interest between a private property owner’s
(patent holder’s) right to create a successful business and the ability of others (potential
patent licensees) to negotiate a reasonable royalty rate. In response to this conflict, the patent
field relies upon a self-regulatory system where patent holders agree to be “Reasonable and
Non-Discriminatory” in their licensing practices. This system produces two concrete
benefits. First, it helps correct the power imbalance between two negotiating parties. Second,
it creates a third-party breach of contract right for a party who could not normally bring a
case. As a process, a patent holder agrees to Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory practices
(“RAND”) with a standards-setting organization. Then, if the patent holder does not
reasonably license their patent to a third party who wishes to negotiate for said license, the
third party can sue the patent holder, even though the two parties never finalized an
agreement.
This paper argues a similar system would lend much-needed structure to online data use.
Creating a voluntary, quasi-self-regulatory regime would allow greater transparency as to
corporate data practices, facilitate the creation of industry standards as to “reasonable” data
use, balance the interests of corporation and consumer, and create a legal right for consumers
who have had their personal data misused (in a way that could more easily support a classaction). The paper proceeds in four parts. The first part looks at current norms of data use and
the issues a proposed system would need to address. The second part reviews and
summarizes past intellectual property approaches to privacy, as well as each approach’s
respective drawbacks. The third part examines RAND commitments and their operation in
the realm of patent law. The fourth part discusses a system for implementing RAND
commitments in privacy law, and addresses potential benefits and drawbacks of the
approach.

*

Rachel Wilka holds degrees in law from University of Washington and Finance and Management
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Group, Inc. The author’s views are her own and offered in her personal capacity; they do not reflect
the views of Zillow Group or any other organization. The author would like to thank Professor Ryan
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63

Wilka - Privacy Commitments - Copyedited_BM (1).docx (Do Not Delete)

64

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ONLINE

8/17/18 2:16 PM

[Vol. 93:63

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 65
A. Consumers Need to Know How Their Data Is Being
Used ....................................................................................... 65
B. Big Data Negatively Affects the Offline World .................... 67
C. It Is Not Clear Where Companies Are Sending Data ............ 68
D. Scholars Have Proposed Protecting Private Data as
Intellectual Property .............................................................. 70
I.
PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED IP APPROACHES TO
PRIVACY ..................................................................................... 72
A. Copyright ............................................................................... 72
1. Copyright Approach to Privacy Law ............................... 72
2. Potential Problems with a Copyright Approach .............. 74
B. Trade Secret ........................................................................... 75
1. A Trade Secret Approach to Privacy Law ....................... 75
2. Potential Problems with a Trade Secret Approach .......... 77
C. Trademark Law ..................................................................... 78
1. A Trademark Approach to Privacy Law.......................... 78
2. Potential Problems with a Trademark Approach ............. 79
II.
RAND COMMITMENTS ............................................................ 81
A. The Fundamentals of Standard Essential Patents .................. 82
B. The Fundamentals of RAND/FRAND Commitments .......... 84
C. Legal Effects of RAND Commitments and Microsoft v.
Motorola ................................................................................ 84
III.
RAND FOR PRIVACY ................................................................ 87
A. Online Companies Impact Our Everyday Life ...................... 87
1. Online Companies Often Dominate Online Market
Segments .......................................................................... 87
2. Consumers Have Little Control over What Online
Services They Use ........................................................... 90
3. Online Companies Have a Vastly Superior
Bargaining Position in Relation to Consumers ............... 90
B. RAND Commitments Could Accomplish Real Privacy
Objectives .............................................................................. 91
1. RAND Commitments Would Facilitate
Accountability ................................................................. 91
2. RAND Commitments Are Workable for the Industry
and Provide Flexibility While Still Allowing for
Regulation ........................................................................ 92
3. RAND Commitments Support Concrete
Enforcement and Remedies ............................................. 94
4. RAND Commitments Would Address Bargaining
Power Imbalances ............................................................ 95
C. How Could a RAND System Work in Practice? ................... 96
1. Finding an SSO ................................................................ 96
2. Expanding on Existing Legislation, in Word and in
Deed ................................................................................. 97

Wilka - Privacy Commitments - Copyedited_BM (1).docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

8/17/18 2:16 PM

PRIVACY COMMITMENTS

65

D. Concerns with a RAND Approach ........................................ 99
1. Making Assertions Concrete ........................................... 99
2. Legally Demonstrating That a Company Violated Its
Commitments ................................................................ 100
3. Incentivizing Companies to Begin Making RAND
Commitments ................................................................ 100
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 101
INTRODUCTION
Current privacy laws chase technological advances, and seem
perennially unable to provide consumers effective ways to protect their
privacy interests.1 The insufficiencies in privacy law are not a simple
outcome of a dearth of statute or regulation.2 Specific laws may protect
privacy in specific contexts, but lawmakers continually create legal
requirements with similar flaws: (1) application to a limited
demographic; (2) overly vague or easily avoided definitions of
“violation of privacy”; (3) protection of limited types of “personally
identifiable information” (PII); and/or (4) avoidance of meaningful
requirements through overly generous safe harbors.3
A. Consumers Need to Know How Their Data Is Being Used
In any discussion of privacy practices, the biggest hurdle to achieving
better, privacy-respecting, data use practices and regulation is getting the
technology sector to care about, and invest in, privacy.4 Without
corporate buy-in, privacy practices will continue to rely on outdated
privacy laws and enforcement by overworked government agencies. The
best way to motivate “big-tech” is to empower and mobilize consumers
to pressure the private sector into creating meaningful protections. To do
1. See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1146 (2002).
2. Id. at 1090.
3. Id. at 1088–89 (discussing the problems with the definition of privacy described); Andrew
Chin & Anne Klinefelter, Differential Privacy as a Response to the Reidentification Threat: The
Facebook Advertiser Case Study, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1418, 1426 n.37 (2012) (“noting that the FTC’s
proposals are ‘supported by a wide cross section of roundtable participants who stated that the
traditional distinction between PII and non-PII continues to lose significance due to changes in
technology and the ability to re-identify consumers from supposedly anonymous data’” (quoting
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 43 (Dec.
2010), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/HYZ4-EEND])).
4. Joseph Turow, Google Still Doesn’t Care About Your Privacy, FORTUNE (June 28, 2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/06/28/gmail-google-account-ads-privacy-concerns-home-settings-policy/
[https://perma.cc/U88P-NBUP].
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so, consumers must first understand what they are fighting for—in other
words, why privacy matters.
Until recently, consumers were apathetic to digital privacy practices.5
They did not read companies’ privacy policies6 or see big data affecting
their analog lives. As Donald Rumsfeld phrased it, “As we know, there
are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know
there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things
we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we
don’t know we don’t know.”7 Until recently, the average digital
consumer only knew about the “known-knowns” of data use, like
Facebook using his or her data to personalize shoe advertisements. The
average consumer viewed corporate data use as innocuous and
ignorable. As a result, companies saw no need to invest in privacy
protections on the consumers’ behalf.
The landscape has now changed. The “unknowns” have emerged.
Data breaches expose credit card information,8 medical histories and
prescription lists,9 financial holdings and home addresses,10 and personal
e-mails.11 Over the course of 2014, 47% of U.S. adults, or 110 million
5. Greg Satell, Let’s Face It, We Don’t Really Care About Privacy, FORBES (Dec. 1, 2014, 12:38
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/gregsatell/2014/12/01/lets-face-it-we-dont-really-care-aboutprivacy/#53ea22825698 [https://perma.cc/P297-YXYZ]; Hayley Tsukayama, People Care More
About
Convenience
than
Privacy
Online,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
7,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/10/07/people-care-more-aboutconvenience-than-privacy-online/?utm_term=.a889c2c591a6 [https://perma.cc/AWB9-V5FV].
6. Aaron Smith, Half of Online Americans Don’t Know What a Privacy Policy Is, PEW RESEARCH
CTR.: FACT TANK (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/04/half-ofamericans-dont-know-what-a-privacy-policy-is/ [https://perma.cc/2GBZ-4GPB].
7. David A. Graham, Rumsfeld’s Knowns and Unknowns: The Intellectual History of a Quip,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/03/rumsfelds-knownsand-unknowns-the-intellectual-history-of-a-quip/359719/ [https://perma.cc/WH9H-XBQ6].
8. Brian Krebs, The Target Breach, by the Numbers, KREBS ON SECURITY, (May 6, 2014 12:24
AM), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/05/the-target-breach-by-the-numbers/
[https://perma.cc/C75X-BLFF].
9. Coral Garnick, Premera Negligent in Data Breach, 5 Lawsuits Claim, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar.
27, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/premera-negligent-in-data-breach-5-lawsuitsclaim/ [https://perma.cc/B6HY-9TPW]; Shannon Pettypiece, Sony Hack Reveals Health Details on
Employees,
Children,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(Dec.
11,
2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-11/sony-hack-reveals-health-details-onemployees-and-their-children (last visited June 11, 2018).
10. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Matthew Goldstein, & Nicole Perlroth, JPMorgan Chase Hacking
Affects 76 Million Households, N.Y. TIMES: DEAL BOOK (Oct. 2, 2014, 12:50 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/02/jpmorgan-discovers-further-cyber-security-issues/
[https://perma.cc/JE8Y-9SG9].
11. Elizabeth Weise, Hijackers Get up Close and Personal with Hacked Accounts, USA TODAY
(Nov. 6, 2014, 10:08 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/11/06/email-hijackingphishing-google/18564671/ [https://perma.cc/SN3Y-L6DF].
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individuals, had their personal data stolen.12 By 2017, approximately the
same proportion of Americans were affected by the Equifax hack
alone.13 Outside of data breaches, companies argue that data distributed
to partners is anonymized, but in the Human Genome Project, a
respected medical study, between 84–97% of participants could be reidentified (i.e., their names could be connected to their individual
“anonymized” data).14
Unless users gain insight into how their data is being used, and where
it is going, they cannot make an informed choice as to which companies
can access their data. Moreover, because companies may share data with
other parties without the user’s knowledge, the user’s choice of which
services to use may be moot. The data could be transmitted to companies
the user consciously chose to avoid by the services he or she is choosing
to use. As big data starts affecting our non-digital lives, respect for
privacy, and responsible data use more broadly, becomes increasingly
important. Consumer data analytics, based on collective user data,
impacts every aspect of our lives including not only areas like marketing,
but also our career,15 credit score,16 and exposure to targeted, deceptive
information.17 The era of privacy as a theoretical concern is over; big data
is here to affect our lives. It is either control, or be controlled by, big data.
B. Big Data Negatively Affects the Offline World
Big data uses affect our non-digital lives in countless ways every day.
Big data may affect the job-interview process to judge whether an
applicant has the right “culture fit” with a company,18 what college a high
12. Jose Pagliery, Half of American Adults Hacked This Year, CNNMONEY (May 28, 2014),
http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/28/technology/security/hack-data-breach/ [https://perma.cc/NN6F7FUF].
13. Ryan Grenoble, 2017 Was the Year of Hacks. 2018 Probably Won’t Be Better, HUFFPOST
(Dec.
30,
2017,
7:00
AM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/data-breachhacks_us_5a3a7f56e4b025f99e13cdbe [https://perma.cc/L9BG-LVM4].
14. LATANYA SWEENEY, AKUA ABU & JULIA WINN, HARVARD UNIV. DATA PRIVACY LAB,
IDENTIFYING PARTICIPANTS IN THE PERSONAL GENOME PROJECT BY NAME 3 (2013).
15. Tim Adams, Job Hunting Is a Matter of Big Data, Not How You Perform, GUARDIAN: THE
OBSERVER (May 10, 2014, 4:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/may/10/jobhunting-big-data-interview-algorithms-employees [https://perma.cc/JL3A-YWPZ].
16. Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data, 18 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 148, 150–51 (2016).
17. Claire Cain Miller, When Algorithms Discriminate, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (July 9, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/upshot/when-algorithms-discriminate.html
[https://perma.cc/8C8C-TAW7].
18. About,
ARTISIAN
FOR
HIRE,
INC.,
https://artisantalent.com/about-artisan/
[https://perma.cc/83ZF-EXRJ]; cf. Lydia Dishman, How Big Data Might Change the Way You Find
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school student gets into,19 and potentially even consumer credit scores.20
Companies will argue that online services utilizing personal information
have the ability to help consumers more than hurt them. Big data is touted
as the solution to discrimination,21 bad bosses,22 and inaccurate or
incomplete profiles with credit agencies.23
However, even if big data could deliver on those promises from a
technical or theoretical standpoint, its benefit to consumers depends on
the truthfulness of the data. In other words, an individual’s ability to get a
job or a mortgage can depend on the data stored by online companies and
can conversely be negatively impacted by inaccurate information. In
reality, data collected through normal avenues “only represents a thin
slice of us” and 30–50% of collected online data is inaccurate.24 The
problem is so large that the tech industry is already investing millions to
try to solve it themselves.25 So far, industry attempts to control for quality
have not demonstrated viability.
The power of online companies compared to their consumers means
users currently cannot control how data is used or how it will affect their
lives. To begin taking control of data, users must first understand where
data is going and who is using it.
C. It Is Not Clear Where Companies Are Sending Data
The difficulty of knowing how personal data is used goes beyond the
lack of company transparency with its users—many companies currently
a Job, FAST COMPANY (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.fastcompany.com/3052639/how-big-datamight-change-the-way-you-find-a-job [https://perma.cc/6GH2-XK6S] (discussing job seekers’ use
of big data to gain insight into the culture of potential employers).
19. Darian Somers, Do Colleges Look at Your Social Media Accounts?, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 10,
2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/articles/2017-02-10/collegesreally-are-looking-at-your-social-media-accounts (last visited June 3, 2018).
20. Colin Wilhelm, Big Data vs. the Credit Gap, POLITICO: THE AGENDA (Feb. 7, 2018, 5:02
AM), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2018/02/07/big-data-credit-gap-000630
[https://perma.cc/6KBC-NF9B].
21. MARTIN WATTENBERG, FERNANDA VIÉGAS & MORITZ HARDT, ATTACKING DISCRIMINATION
WITH SMARTER MACHINE LEARNING,
https://research.google.com/bigpicture/attacking-discrimination-in-ml/
[https://perma.cc/6QWHRPB5].
22. Dishman, supra note 18.
23. Wilhelm, supra note 20.
24. Julian Mitchell, This Data Mining Startup Empowers Consumers to Own Their Digital
Footprint, FORBES (Jan. 25, 2017, 4:25 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/julianmitchell/2017/01/25/this-data-mining-startup-gives-consumersthe-tools-to-own-their-digital-footprint/#554eb0f918db [https://perma.cc/QLS3-37KA].
25. Id.
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do not track, or do not understand, the full scope of how their collected
data is being used. As discussed in the previous section, one of the major
issues with tracking data use is accounting for data breaches. Over the
past several years, large-scale data breaches have become ubiquitous.26
Equifax is the most recent and obvious example.27 Equifax previously
existed as a shining example of both individuals and government putting
trust in keeping their most sensitive data secure through the private
sector.28 We now have no way of knowing where our full financial
histories may be, and our only protection is monitoring after the fact to
avoid direct financial repercussions. The underlying privacy is gone.29
In addition to the nefarious data breach scenario, there are new
technology advancements changing how we must think about data use.
New technologies, including machine learning and artificial intelligence,
ingest large amounts of data, but may save only data useful to the
underlying algorithm(s) or only store the knowledge learned from the
data set (i.e., a derivative predictive value).30 The data has a
transformative effect on the technology, blurring the line between
personal data and company innovation.
Therefore, understanding company data use is dependent on
companies reliably tracking data use, which is far from universal. The
illusion of comprehensive data tracking shattered recently with
Facebook’s admission that it allowed political targeting organizations to
access millions of Facebook user profiles in violation of its own
policies.31 While Facebook clearly mishandled data, its practices are
sophisticated compared to the average startup’s blind use of data.32 A
real solution to current lackluster privacy practices will need to not only
solve the privacy concerns of today; it will have to be scalable,
26. Press Release, Identity Theft Res. Ctr., At Mid-Year, U.S. Data Breaches Increase at Record
Pace (July 18, 2017), https://www.idtheftcenter.org/Press-Releases/2017-mid-year-data-breachreport-press-release [https://perma.cc/9HPQ-PFAA].
27. Donna Borak & Kathryn Vasel, The Equifax Hack Could Be Worse than We Thought,
CNNMONEY (Feb. 10, 2018, 10:43 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2018/02/09/pf/equifax-hack-senatedisclosure/index.html [https://perma.cc/LDB8-2GZ8].
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. David Rubinstein, Where Does Big Data Go From Here?, SD TIMES (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://sdtimes.com/data/big-data-go/ [https://perma.cc/76CM-GQNP].
31. Matthew Rosenberg et al., How Trump Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trumpcampaign.html?action=click&module=Intentional&pgtype=Article (last visited June 3, 2018).
32. See Ronald A. Klain, Proof Startups Can’t Afford to Ignore the Law, FORTUNE (Mar. 2,
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/03/02/startups-ignore-law/ [https://perma.cc/7Q7V-52DJ].
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adaptable, and understandable in order to avoid being outpaced by
technology or ignored by industry.
D. Scholars Have Proposed Protecting Private Data as Intellectual
Property
Knowing the full risk of online data use, leading academics have
proposed solving the privacy problem through intellectual property (IP)
law frameworks, attempting to create a type of intangible property right
in one’s personal data.33 The idea behind most of the approaches is if
users have an ownership interest in their data, then use without
compensation, or at least consent, would empower them by providing a
cause of action. Previous published works considered potential systems
based on trade secret, trademark, and copyright law.34 Prior IP
approaches generally have not met with a great deal of success.35
Trademark, trade secret, and copyright law just do not provide a
practical solution to protecting privacy rights.36
However, there is a very promising unexplored avenue of IP law:
patent law. At first glance, the omission of a patent approach to privacy
protection makes sense. Personal information is not an “invention” and
even personal browsing data may not be “novel.”37 Despite the initial
reaction that privacy law and patent law are completely incompatible
fields, however, there is a common problem in both fields: how do you
both respect the free market’s ability to contract for use rights and
prevent extremely lopsided contracts resulting from unequal bargaining
power?
In patent law, this problem manifests as a Standard Essential Patent
(SEP), where a piece of patented technology, generally a piece of
software or hardware, is so integral to the industry that its use is required
for anyone creating new technology in the space.38 This presents a
dilemma: the company holding an SEP has a legitimate right to receive
license revenue from the use of the invention, but the potential licensee
does not have a meaningful alternative technology to use.39 The patent

33. See infra Part I.
34. See infra Part I.
35. See infra section I.A.2; section I.B.2; section I.C.2.
36. See infra section I.A.2; section I.B.4; section I.C.6.
37. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
38. Jeffrey C. Johnson, Standard Essential Patents—The Transactional Side, 86 BNA INSIGHTS
202, 202 (May 24, 2013).
39. Id.
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holder is able to demand outrageous licensing fees, especially from
current or potential competitors, which stifles the development of new
inventions and competition for market share.40 A similar problem exists
in privacy protection for two reasons: (1) just a handful of companies
completely dominate categories of online services41; and (2) choice of
service provider is often outside of the consumer’s control, as in the case
of employers selecting a provider for employees. In the privacy context,
however, market-dominant companies, instead of using their bargaining
power to obtain exorbitant licensing fees, “obtain control” of users’
data.42 Users have to agree to a click-through, essentially waiving their
right to challenge the company’s use of their data, similar to a potential
licensee who could be forced to pay outlandish royalties for a patent.43
For patents, the SEP conundrum led to a specific policy response: the
creation
of
Reasonable
and
Non-Discriminatory
(RAND)
44
commitments. In basic terms, RAND commitments are a voluntary
obligation by a company to license its patented technology only under
reasonable and non-discriminatory licensing terms.45 The commitment
creates a third-party cause of action against SEP holders who refuse to
offer potential licensees a reasonable and non-discriminatory license.46
In the privacy context, a similar schema could speak to issues arising
from a similar imbalance in negotiating power. However, to fully correct
the problem, any IP approach would need to accomplish several goals.
First, it would need to mandate accountability as to data use and sharing
in order for the public to fully understand current practices. Second, it
would have to address the inequities in bargaining power between an
individual user and data-collecting companies. Third, it would need to
represent a viable avenue for the companies themselves (i.e., not be seen
as overly burdensome or incompatible with an industry’s ability to
monetize). Fourth, the model must include both government regulation
and industry self-regulating aspects, in order to allow for flexibility of
industry norms combined with the penalties of government regulation

40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Jeff Desjardins, This Chart Reveals Google’s True Dominance over the Web,
VISUAL CAPITALIST (Apr. 20, 2018, 12:48 PM), http://www.visualcapitalist.com/this-chart-revealsgoogles-true-dominance-over-the-web/ [https://perma.cc/RG5N-MWSY].
42. Id.
43. Felix T. Wu, The Constitutionality of Consumer Privacy Regulation, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
69, 71.
44. See infra Section II discussion of RAND commitments.
45. See infra Section II discussion of RAND commitments.
46. See infra Section II discussion of RAND commitments.
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for incentivizing compliance. Finally, it needs to provide a realistic and
approachable remedy accessible to the public, either through the creation
(or appointment) of a regulating body or by providing clear and real
incentives for private rights of actions.
This paper argues a RAND system in the privacy law context could
accomplish the above objectives. The paper proceeds by discussing: (1)
previously proposed IP approaches and their shortcomings; (2) RAND
commitments, both what they are and how they work in the patent law
context; and (3) how RAND Commitments could apply in the privacy
law field.
I.

PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED IP APPROACHES TO PRIVACY

Scholars and policymakers have sought to address the problem of
overbroad data use (i.e., lack of respect for privacy) in a number of
ways. Some highly visible scholars suggest applying IP law concepts to
the privacy context using different models. Generally, IP approaches to
privacy have analogized privacy rights to three different categories of
intellectual property: (A) copyright law; (B) trade secret law; and (C)
trademark law.
A.

Copyright

1.

Copyright Approach to Privacy Law

The constitutional purpose of copyright law is “to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.”47 The Copyright Act of 1976 grants protection to a
wide range of “creative or artistic works, including ‘literary works,
musical works (including lyrics), dramatic works (including
accompanying music), pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial,
graphic and sculptural works, motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, sound recordings, and architectural works.’”48
Jonathan Zittrain discusses copyright law in the privacy context in his
article, What the Publisher Can Teach the Patient: Intellectual Property
and Privacy in an Era of Trusted Privication.49 In the discussion,
47. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
48. Emily S. Day, Double-Edged Scissor: Legal Protection for Fashion Design, 86 N.C. L. REV.
237, 245 (2007).
49. Jonathan Zittrain, What the Publisher Can Teach the Patient: Intellectual Property and
Privacy in an Era of Trusted Privacation, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1201 (2000).
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Zittrain looks at some of the common problems faced by those who have
had their copyrights violated and those who have had their privacy rights
violated.50 In both contexts, the internet enabled problematic behavior by
creating increased accessibility and the ability to “copy” material created
by the owner, whether an artist’s song or a user’s browsing history.51
Additionally, in both contexts, “monetization” of the “owned” work
benefits a third party without providing any benefit to the creator.52 In
the context of music copyright, a torrent site monetizes the work through
advertisements.53 In the privacy realm, a company monetizes users’ data,
either directly through targeted advertisements, or through an ad hoc
approach of selling a customer “profile” to an outside organization.54
Zittrain’s argument focuses on a “well-designed and trusted” system
to protect privacy rights, and notably includes a discussion of
“prevention versus punishment” mechanisms.55 Zittrain points out that in
both copyright and privacy contexts, punishment can be an incomplete
remedy to the owner.56 In the music industry, for example, it is has been
difficult for copyright owners to track all the “pirates” of their
copyrighted material.57 Generally, a copyright holder is, practically,
unable to obtain statutory damages from most copyright infringers, even
when using Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) enforcement
mechanisms.58 In the privacy context, it is similarly difficult for
individuals to track all uses of their private information by companies
like Facebook, Google, and/or their associates.59 Obtaining non-trivial
50. See generally id.
51. Id. at 1201(“Both law and technology influence such balancing, making it more or less
palatable to use data for particular purposes—whether one is an individual making a copy of a
popular song for a friend, or a hospital selling a list of maternity ward patients to a day care
service.”).
52. Jason Morris & Ed Lavandera, Why Big Companies Buy, Sell Your Data, CNN (Aug. 23,
2012,
3:52
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2012/08/23/tech/web/big-data-acxiom/index.html
[https://perma.cc/XXJ3-ZEQW].
53. How Do BitTorrent Sites like the Pirate Bay Make Money?, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/052815/how-do-bittorrent-sites-pirate-bay-makemoney.asp [https://perma.cc/6R97-ZDZN].
54. Zittrain, supra note 49, at 1229 (citing Stacy Collett, Standard in Works for Sharing ECustomer Data: Ability to Easily Share Information Alarms Privacy Experts, Despite Planned
Guidelines, COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 22, 1999, at 2).
55. See id. at 1222 (specifically Section C. “Prevention Rather than Punishment of Undesired
Behavior”).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See id.at 1248. The DMCA allows copyright holders to submit “takedown requests” to any
platform or person reproducing their work without permission.
59. Id. at 1233.
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remedies from companies violating user privacy has proven nearly
impossible.60
To create a “trusted” system in the copyright arena, the industry used
technological advancements, such as file encryption and tracking. There
were also systematic legal changes, including the availability of DMCA
take-down requests and negotiation of license rights with outside
companies to stream music and movies (e.g., Pandora or Netflix). These
two developments curbed the scope of unlicensed use of copyrighted
material by end users.61
2.

Potential Problems with a Copyright Approach

Zittrain’s approach was met by several critiques. Zittrain’s article
focuses on implementing copyright frameworks in a limited sphere of
privacy law—namely, medical patient privacy.62 In that narrow context,
the “well-designed and trusted” system approach might lead to
meaningful improvements. The medical industry has unique statutory
privacy requirements and well-established privacy rights which could
enable it to implement Zittrain’s proposed system.63 However, in the
wider realm of privacy law, the system is more difficult to envision
because the characteristics of a “trusted” system, and the criteria used to
measure a “well-designed” system, drastically vary across industries.64
The system also makes a basic assumption: personal information can
be “owned” under copyright law. As one scholar noted,65 this could lead
to a plaintiff, seeking to control his or her personal data using copyright
law, “feel[ing] initially incongruous: she was seeking to replace the
personal harm she felt with a commercial one and thus was required to

60. Id.
61. Id. at 1214–16. Another discussion of the connection between privacy law and copyright is
discussed in Pamela Samuelson’s paper Protecting Privacy through Copyright?. Pamela
Samuelson, Protecting Privacy through Copyright?, in PRIVACY IN THE MODERN AGE: THE
SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS 192 (Marc Rotenberg et al. eds., 2015). However, the discussion in that
paper focuses on privacy rights in photographic images, including the emergence of “revenge porn”
and sharing of images that were not willingly provided by the subject, rather than on use of
materials and data collected directly by companies for users of their service. The focus on images
also is an area where individuals have traditionally had more control over privacy through both the
DMCA and publicity rights, and so is only tangentially related to this paper’s topic.
62. See Zittrain, supra note 49, at 1226–45 (“Medical Data: A Trajectory of Personal Privacy
Worries—and Responses to Them—in a Digitally Networked Environment”).
63. Id. at 1237.
64. Solove, supra note 1, at 1088–89.
65. In an example involving Dorthy Lewis and Malcolm Gladwell.
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accept herself as a subject that could be owned.”66 In other words, the
system reduces the personal details of a user’s life to a quantifiable
value, which a company can buy away from you. As long as a company
can afford a fair price, consumers have no right to refuse.
Another criticism of a copyright approach considers the basic power
dynamic differences between privacy law and copyright law. In Code:
Version 2.0, Lawrence Lessig writes:
The big difference between copyright and privacy law, however,
is the political economy that seeks a solution to each problem.
With copyright, the interests threatened are powerful and well
organized; with privacy, the interests threatened are diffuse and
disorganized. With copyright, the values on the other side of
protection (the commons, or the public domain) are neither
compelling nor well understood. With privacy, the values on the
other side of protection (security, the war against terrorism) are
compelling and well understood. The result of these differences,
as any political theorist would then predict, is that over the past
ten years, while we’ve seen a lot of legislative and technical
changes to solve the problems facing copyright, we’ve seen very
few that would solve the problems of privacy.67
Personal privacy interests are innately “diffuse and disorganized”
because they belong solely to individuals without commercial interests
in the information.68 Expecting individuals to negotiate license
agreements or require technical standards for organizations with access
to their information, in the way a large corporation typically would, is
unrealistic given the disparate negotiation positions of the two parties.69
B.

Trade Secret

1.

A Trade Secret Approach to Privacy Law

Trade secret law was originally a form of common law tort, later
encoded as the principles of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.70 The
66. Laura A. Heymann, How to Write a Life: Some Thoughts on Fixation and the
Copyright/Privacy Divide, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 868–69 (2009).
67. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 200–01 (2006).
68. Id. at 200.
69. Id. at 201 (stating that over the last 10 years, “we’ve seen very few [solutions] that would
solve the problems of privacy.”).
70. UNIF.
TRADE
SECRETS
ACT
(UNIF.
LAW
COMM’N
1985),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trade%20secrets/utsa_final_85.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9AXF-XW99].
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Uniform Trade Secrets Act has been adopted in forty-seven states.71 The
main objective of trade secret law is to protect commercial entities from
outside use of their secret information. Also known as the law of
“commercial morality,”72 trade secret law generally protects formulas,
patterns, compilations, programs, devices, methods, techniques, and
processes.73 Trade secret protection extends for as long as the
information remains secret.74 Generally, a trade secret does not require
formal registration, and is only codified when a trade secret claim is
made.75 To successfully bring a trade secret claim, a plaintiff must
satisfy three basic requirements: (1) the information must have value and
be a secret (i.e., it was protectable subject matter under trade secret law);
(2) reasonable efforts must have been made to protect the information;
and (3) the information must have been obtained through wrongful
conduct.76
Pamela Samuelson’s article, Privacy as Intellectual Property?,77
proposes a trade-secret-based privacy system.78 Samuelson’s approach
looks at establishing a market right for individuals in their consumer
data, where online users could force companies to pay for the right to
use their data, subject to specific restrictions. In other words, individuals
could “license” their data to companies with a requirement that the
company keep said data private (i.e., not share it with third parties).79

71. Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Legislative Facts Sheet—Trade Secret
Act,
UNIFORM
LAW
COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act
[https://perma.cc/4JVM-ESPH].
72. ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 26 (6th ed. 2012).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. James W. Hill, Trade Secrets, Unjust Enrichment, and the Classification of Obligations, 4
VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, 4 n.19 (1999) (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475–76
(1974) (“The protection accorded the trade secret holder is against the disclosure or unauthorized
use of the trade secret by those to whom the secret has been confided under the express or implied
restriction of nondisclosure or nonuse. The law also protects the holder of a trade secret against
disclosure or use when the knowledge is gained, not by the owner’s volition, but by some ‘improper
means,’ which may include theft, wiretapping, or even aerial reconnaissance.”)).
76. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
77. Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (2000).
78. Id. at 1151. Sharon Sandeen has built on Samuelson’s model system and discussed the
evolution of privacy law and trade secret law from common law roots, and the different paths the
two sets of laws have taken. Sharon K. Sandeen, Relative Privacy: What Privacy Advocates Can
Learn from Trade Secret Law, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 667, 673 (2006).
79. Samuelson, supra note 77, at 1152.
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One benefit of the proposal is it would provide doctrinal support to
consumers without burdensome government regulation.80
As discussed above, trade secret law evolved from the Uniform Trade
Secret Act, which was adopted state-by-state until it encompassed the
vast majority of the country with a uniform standard.81 Privacy law, on
the other hand, evolved into mismatched and overlapping state statutes,
niche federal statutes and regulations, and private tort causes of action.82
Sandeen suggests that privacy law could learn from trade secret law by
creating a uniform legal schema adopted across states and focusing on
“reasonableness” to help clarify and develop the legal application.83
Sandeen’s suggestion has notable benefits, especially in contrast to the
current hodge-podge of privacy law.84 It would create a uniform standard
across (hopefully) all fifty states, and by focusing on reasonableness, the
definition of a violation of privacy could remain flexible and adaptable
to different circumstances and industry norms.85
2.

Potential Problems with a Trade Secret Approach

Despite Samuelson’s unique, free-market-supportive proposal, many
privacy law scholars have dismissed a trade secret approach. One article
argued that a trade secret approach would not work because American
law has not adopted the notion of automatic “confidentiality” in
commercial relationships.86 Without the default right to confidentiality in
a commercial relationship, American law would not easily stretch the
definition of confidentiality to cover the relationship between a business
organization and its customer.87 Another scholar noted, “[i]t is also clear
that a trade secret must have some economic/commercial consequence;
that is, the rationale for maintaining secrecy cannot be purely a personal
matter that goes to feelings of dignity and privacy.”88
The sharpest criticism of the trade secret approach is that trade secret
law, in and of itself, has defects capable of bleeding into privacy law:
80. Id. at 1135.
81. See supra discussion Section II.B.1.
82. Sandeen, supra note 78, at 677–78, 687.
83. Id. at 694–95.
84. Id. at 681 n.84 (discussing the hodge-podge that was unfair competition law before deciding
there was no common law trade secret doctrine).
85. Id. at 694, 704.
86. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 180–81 (2007).
87. Id.
88. Eric E. Johnson, Trade Secret Subject Matter, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 545, 556 (2010).
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Unfortunately, the commercial morality approach doesn’t cure
the defects of tort-based theories of trade secrecy. “Commercial
morality” has no more substantive content than “unfair
competition” or “unjust enrichment”—it still requires some
external source to determine what behavior is and is not moral.
To be sure, the commercial morality approach does at least point
us to an external source—the emergent consensus (if there is
one) of what constitutes acceptable behavior. But relying on
such a vague norm to set legal standards has a number of
problems. It is context and time dependent; normal behavior in
one industry may end up being illegal in another . . . . It is likely
to lead to inefficient results, retarding rather than enhancing
innovation.89
This critique does not preclude any reasonableness-based approach to
privacy protection; it simply suggests that reasonableness, without some
kind of concrete basis of measurement, will likely lead to an impractical
and inconsistent application of law.90
C.

Trademark Law

1.

A Trademark Approach to Privacy Law

Under trademark law, “a trademark is any word, name, symbol, or
design, or any combination thereof, used in commerce to identify and
distinguish the goods of one manufacturer or seller from those of another
and to indicate the source of the goods.”91 Under the Lanham Act, a
trademark can be used to “‘protect the elements of a design that indicate
the source of the product,’ such as a logo, ‘but does not provide general
protection for designs.’”92
Trademarks help brands maintain a prestige premium (i.e., consumer
trust and goodwill in a brand and its products).93
89. THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH
120 (Rochelle C. Dryfus & Kathrine J. Strandburg eds., 2011).
90. Id.
91. Trademark,
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/trademark
[https://perma.cc/BB2J-38MW]; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018).
92. Day, supra note 48, at 248 (quoting A Bill to Provide Protection for Fashion Design: Hearing
on H.R. 5055 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of Rep. Howard L. Berman, Ranking
Member, Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property)).
93. See Paul Campos, How a Louis Vuitton Bag Can Explain the Higher Education Bubble,
WEEK (Feb. 26, 2014), http://theweek.com/articles/450341/how-louis-vuitton-bag-explain-highereducation-bubble [https://perma.cc/TCJ9-46A8].
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Several scholars have suggested methods of incorporating trademark
law principles into privacy law. One author, David Dante Troutt,
suggests trademark law as a way to take control of, and create
intellectual property rights in, one’s own identity.94 His discussion,
however, was more of a social commentary than a true suggestion of a
system.95 Another author, Paul Ohm, discusses trademark law as a way
of implementing a notice-and-choice model in his article, Branding
Privacy.96 Generally, notice-and-choice models of privacy regulation
presume the best way to protect consumer privacy is to inform
consumers of an entity’s data use practices and provide a mechanism to
“opt-out.”97 Ohm suggests implementing notice-and-choice by having an
entity commit to standards of treatment for private information.98 If the
company later chooses to change its policy, it would have to change the
trademark displayed for its product or service in order to notify
consumers of the change.99 For example, if Facebook were to change its
privacy practices, it would be required to pick a new name, like
“Facebook Prime.” Ohm’s suggestion goes beyond the traditional
notice-and-choice model; it essentially guarantees consumers that the
companies they provide their personal information will continue
providing the same level of privacy protection or be forced to surrender
their trademarks, an unappealing prospect for most profitable companies.
In part, Ohm’s argument rests on the assumption that because consumers
are naturally inclined to choose services with strong privacy standards,
an appropriate privacy-protecting system need only present a consistent
standard and clear notice when a standard changes.100
2.

Potential Problems with a Trademark Approach

There are several potential flaws in Ohm’s trademark-based approach.
The first is the feasibility of changing the entire American trademark
system to support companies changing their names every time they
update privacy policies. Currently, an average company will change its

94. David Dante Troutt, A Portrait of the Trademark as a Black Man: Intellectual Property,
Commodification, and Redescription, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141 (2005).
95. See generally id. (discussing using trademark law as a way of providing compensation for the
use of one’s identity, especially for those of color).
96. Paul Ohm, Branding Privacy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 907 (2013).
97. Id. at 929.
98. Id. at 945–46.
99. Id. at 958–59.
100. Id. at 984–85.
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privacy policy at least one to two times per year.101 These changes can
lead to weakened privacy protections for consumers, and often do, but
can also encompass non-threatening, or even beneficial, changes
enhancing consumer privacy protections. Examples of useful changes
include: clarifying language, adding new privacy protections, or adding
provisions to ensure the company is complying with new laws. Alerting
the consumer through a trademark, without further explanation, would
be both heavily burdensome to the company and confusing to
consumers.
Moreover, changes in privacy standards are difficult to demonstrate
because they can be implemented without altering a company’s official
privacy policy; security and privacy standards are oftentimes
proprietary, and therefore inaccessible to the public. A company fearing
giving up a trademark is necessarily incentivized to not update its
public-facing privacy standards, even when change is beneficial to
privacy, in order to maintain absolute consistency. The threat of a brand
identity loss may also incentivize companies to curtail privacy standards
development altogether to avoid falling below the standard.
Another problem is Ohm assumes consumers need only be made
aware of changes to privacy practices, i.e., a notice-and-choice model is
sufficient.102 In contrast, as one scholar, Frank Pasquale, notes:
[C]onsumers are not flocking to companies like Facebook and
Google out of a conscious preference for the privacy policies on
offer. Rather, they are drawn to such firms because of their finetuning and personalization of search and social network
services. Each firm’s hostility to privacy may be an important
reason why they have the data needed to provide such finetuning and personalization, or they may simply be taking
advantage of near-monopoly status as the highest quality search
and social network experience. Given the opacity of operations
at such firms, we may never know how necessary invasions of
privacy are to their business models.103
New approaches to privacy law should seek solutions to the
imbalance in power between companies with near-monopoly market
positions and disorganized consumers, rather than merely increasing the
101. See, e.g., Previous Privacy Policies, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/en/privacy/previous
[https://perma.cc/5BF2-5DSU];
Updates:
Privacy
Policy,
GOOGLE,
https://policies.google.com/privacy/archive [https://perma.cc/P6XW-SSB9].
102. Ohm, supra note 96, at 984–85.
103. Frank Pasquale, Privacy, Antitrust, and Power, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1009, 1014–15
(2013).
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visibility of “take it or leave it” privacy policies. Notice-and-choice
models have also been criticized for their inability to fully notify
consumers of the company’s policies and for the lack of real choice on
the part of the consumer.104 Consumers rarely, if ever, read the privacy
policies of every site they visit (and would generally find them
incomprehensible if they tried).105 As Felix Wu states,
[E]ven if consumers could know perfectly what will happen to
their data in an immediate transaction, it is virtually impossible
for them to assess the long-term effects of that transaction on
their privacy. Online services may also exhibit network effects
or otherwise have characteristics that make it more difficult for
consumers unhappy with a company’s privacy policies to move
to a competitor.106
II.

RAND COMMITMENTS

As discussed in the previous section, leading scholars have
considered a variety of IP approaches for protecting privacy. Each
attempts to create a property right to allow consumers to force
companies to respect and protect their data. However, all of these
approaches face a similar barrier to implementation—consumers do not
have enough power, individually, to assert a property right against a
large online company.
This paper asserts that RAND commitments could solve this fatal
flaw. RAND commitments are a practical, self-regulating, intellectual
property-based legal tool that would work well in the context of privacy
law because the RAND system’s core purpose is to address equivalent
inequities in bargaining power. In the patent sector, beginning decades
ago, associations within an industry would form and cross-license
patents among members in order to encourage innovation.107 However,
those same associations would keep out new competitors without
valuable patents of their own, and create barriers to entry.108 For
example, an individual with a patent on a car’s gas tank could prevent
other companies from manufacturing cars compatible with normal filling
stations. RAND commitments were created to address the concern of
104. Wu, supra note 43, at 71.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Daniel S. Sternberg, A Brief History of RAND, 20 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 211, 215–17
(2014).
108. Id.
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market suppression by companies, or industry groups, with marketdominant positions.109 The concerns run parallel with those of online
data use, where large companies have kept relatively similar, suboptimal standards, for the treatment of consumer data. To understand
how RAND commitments would work for privacy, we first examine
how said commitments work in patent law.
Stated broadly, RAND is a commitment made by SEP holders (i.e.
the market-dominating companies) to offer Fair, Reasonable, and NonDiscriminatory (FRAND or RAND) license terms to potential
licensees.110 The framework rests on several important underlying
concepts: (A) the definition of an SEP and the types of standards an SEP
can encompass; and (B) the definition of a RAND commitment and the
types of behavior that can violate RAND commitments. The section also
examines: (C) how RAND commitments have worked on the ground.
A. The Fundamentals of Standard Essential Patents
SEPs are “patents that cover technologies that are considered an
established standard in a particular industry.”111 In other words, SEPs are
patents owned by a particular company but necessary for an industry at
large. There are three basic types of SEPs: de facto, de jure, and standard
setting organization (SSO) governed. The type of SEP informs different
levels of obligation by the patent holder (i.e., different standards for
RAND commitments) and/or different levels of restriction on potential
licensees (i.e., regulatory requirements).
A de facto SEP covers technology an industry has adopted as a
standard over time, by choice, without any conscious coordination or
formal agreements among industry members.112 The adoption of the
standard generally occurs after a patent is granted, though in some
situations adoption may occur before the patent has been published,
meaning the public does not yet know the technology is being patented.
One example of a de facto SEP is the JPEG file format. Many entities
have claimed to have invented the JPEG format, despite its long history
as a standard in digital photography and electronic images.113 In 2002,
109. Id. at 220–24.
110. Kai-Uwe Kühn et al., Standard Setting Organizations Can Help Solve the Standard
Essential Patents Licensing Problem, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Mar. 2013, at 1–3.
111. Johnson, supra note 38, at 202.
112. SAADAT MALIK, NETWORK SECURITY PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 273 (2003).
113. Paul Caplan, What Is a JPEG? The Invisible Object You See Every Day, ATLANTIC (Sept.
24, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/09/what-is-a-jpeg-the-invisibleobject-you-see-every-day/279954/ [https://perma.cc/K8HC-47VQ].
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Forgent Networks came forward with a patent granted in 1987 over the
JPEG format.114 Eventually, prior art was found to invalidate the patent,
but only after the patent generated years of license fees from companies
using the standard.115 In the case of the JPEG, the industry not only
informally adopted the standard, but the standard was so ubiquitous it
became difficult to identify the original inventor.116
A de jure SEP is a standard patent imposed on an industry by a
government organization.117 One example would be encryption
standards. Government organizations have mandated that particular
industries, like the financial institution industry, must use certain
encryption standards when sending financial information over the
Internet.118
An SSO SEP is a patent chosen by a SSO to be the standard within an
industry. An SSO is an institution that develops, coordinates,
promulgates, and revises technical standards (whether or not patented or
patentable). An example of an SSO is the Institute of Electrical and
Electronic Engineers (IEEE), which uses working groups to choose
uniform standards for cross-industry applicable technologies.119 When
an SSO adopts a standard owned under an SEP, it will often oversee the
licensing and disclosure process with the SEP holder. Many different
interested parties may weigh in on how an SSO decides to adopt a
standard, including the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ).120 Although SSOs will converse with a
company and set standards for an industry, they do not set the monetary
FRAND/RAND royalty rates, avoiding the appearance of price
manipulation. SSO SEPs are increasingly found at the core of highstakes litigation among major players in SEP-reliant industries,121 and
are the focus of this paper.
114. Matt Hines, Graphic Patent Suit Targets Dell, Others, ZDNET (Apr. 23, 2004, 8:17 AM),
https://www.zdnet.com/article/graphics-patent-suit-targets-dell-others/
[https://perma.cc/4AKN8G3Q].
115. James Niccolai, Parts of JPEG Patent Rejected; Forgent to Appeal, COMPUTERWORLD
(May 29, 2006, 1:00 AM), https://www.computerworld.com/article/2545756/security0/parts-ofjpeg-patent-rejected—forgent-to-appeal.html [https://perma.cc/H5AD-4AAL].
116. Id.
117. MALIK, supra note 112, at 273.
118. PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, PCI DSS QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE 16 (Oct. 2010)
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI%20SSC%20Quick%20Reference%20Guide.p
df [https://perma.cc/ZF58-VH5W].
119. Kühn et al., supra note 110, at 1–3.
120. Id.
121. Johnson, supra note 111, at 203.
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B. The Fundamentals of RAND/FRAND Commitments
FRAND/RAND commitments, in the SSO SEP context, are voluntary
obligations, undertaken by a SEP holder, to an SSO.122 The terms
FRAND and RAND are relatively interchangeable: the former stands for
“Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory” and the latter stands for
“Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory.” For purposes of this paper, the
most important concept to understand about RAND commitments is they
create third-party beneficiary rights. In other words, even though the
contract establishing a RAND commitment is created between an
individual SEP holder and an SSO, third parties who wish to license the
SEP holder’s invention/technology are allowed to challenge any license
terms they believe are unreasonable or discriminatory.123
While there is no single definition of what constitutes a fair,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory license, the following basic aspects
tend to be fairly consistent.124 “Reasonable” refers to the equitability of
the set price per use or overall license price of the SEP, generally as
measured against industry standards, averages, and other related
factors.125 “Non-discriminatory” refers to keeping both license terms and
license rates consistent across potential licensees.126 Combined, an SEP
holder must, in order to comply with a RAND commitment, offer nonexclusive licenses with standard royalty, restriction, and permitted use
provisions for all licensees without preferential treatment. Violating a
RAND commitment creates a breach-of-contract claim for the licensee
or potential licensee.
C.

Legal Effects of RAND Commitments and Microsoft v. Motorola

One final important aspect to understand about RAND Commitments
is how they can be used in a legal proceeding. First, if a defendant
formally counters a patent infringement claim with a breach-of-contract
claim, the RAND commitment can be a direct defense to the patent

122. Kühn et al., supra note 110, at 1–3.
123. Id.
124. No official body has formally defined what Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory
licensing schemas are. Anne Layne Farrar et al., Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting
Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 671 (2007).
125. Jeffrey I. D. Lewis, What Is “FRAND” All About? The Licensing of Patents Essential to an
Accepted
Standard
9,
CARDOZO
L.
(June
11,
2014),
https://cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/Lewis.WhatIsFrandAllAbout.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NCDHLAF].
126. Id. at 7.
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infringement claim.127 Second, an infringement defendant can use
RAND commitments to demonstrate the plaintiff has not suffered
irreparable injury, and remedies available at law are sufficient
compensation.128 Specifically, a defendant can argue that back-royalties
at a RAND royalty rate are the appropriate remedy. Even if the
defendant is unable to use RAND commitments to directly counter the
plaintiff’s claims, the defendant can use RAND commitments as a
partial shield. Any evidence a plaintiff tried to charge the defendant
above RAND licensing rates or did anything contrary to the nonmonetary terms set with the SSO can weigh against granting an
injunction or limit monetary damages.129
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.,130 a Ninth Circuit case from 2012,
demonstrates how RAND commitments and equity factors weigh into
the decision to grant an injunction.131 Before its dispute with Microsoft
began, Motorola submitted standard license terms to several SSOs—
namely, the IEEE and the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU).132 The specific standards referred to Wi-Fi technology and .mpeg
file formats.133 On October 21, 2010 (after submitting its RAND license
terms), Motorola offered Microsoft a license agreement for the
implementation of the SEP technology into several Microsoft products,
including the Xbox videogame console and Windows operating
systems.134 The proposed license included a 2.25% royalty rate on the
final price of the goods.135 Microsoft refused the license on those terms,
and continued using the patented technology in their products.136
In 2012, Microsoft brought suit against Motorola, claiming Motorola
was breaching its contractual RAND commitments.137 Microsoft argued
it was entitled to licensing under RAND terms with much lower prices
than those offered by Motorola, and not based on a percentage of final

127. See Doris Johnson Hines & J. Preston (J.P.) Long, Un-FRAND-ly Behavior, 87 BNA PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 572 (2014).
128. RealTek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., No. C-12-03451-RMW, slip op. at 15 (N.D.
Cal. May 20, 2013).
129. Lewis, supra note 125, at 5.
130. 854 F. Supp. 2d 993 (W.D. Wash. 2012), aff’d, 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012).
131. Id. at 999.
132. Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 875–76.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 877.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 878.
137. Id.
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sales prices.138 In response, Motorola claimed the terms were reasonable
and non-discriminatory, as other licensees had previously agreed to the
same terms, and also claimed that the right to obtain RAND rates
requires a preexisting license agreement between the parties, which did
not exist between Microsoft and Motorola.139 While the case was
pending in the United States, Motorola filed suit against Microsoft in
Germany for patent infringement and obtained an injunction against
Microsoft.140
The U.S. district court considered the case in two parts. First, it
considered whether the German decision and its injunctive effect should
be respected.141 The court decided that by suing in Germany before the
U.S. court had issued a judgment, Motorola was attempting to forum
shop and therefore the German injunction had an oppressive effect on
Microsoft.142 The court of appeals also found that Motorola’s actions had
frustrated the lower court’s “ability to adjudicate issues properly,” and
issued an anti-suit injunction on those grounds.143 In the second part of
the case, the court held that the rates offered by Motorola were
unreasonable, and Microsoft was not required to have a pre-existing
license agreement in order to benefit from Motorola’s RAND
commitments.144 In the court’s discussion of the injunction, the RAND
finding informed other equity considerations as to the appropriateness of
injunctive relief.145 The court held that Motorola had not demonstrated
irreparable injury, and so traditional remedies—namely, monetary
damages—were sufficient; Motorola was therefore not entitled to an
injunction.146 The final jury judgment against Motorola, after licensing
offsets, totaled $14.5 million.147
138. Id. at 879.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 875.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 880.
143. Id. The factors of consideration the court used were from E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Andina
Licores S.A., 446 F.3d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 2006), which are “whether the foreign litigation would (1)
frustrate a policy of the forum issuing the injunction; (2) be vexatious or oppressive; (3) threaten the
issuing court’s in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction; or (4) where the proceedings prejudice other
equitable considerations.” Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 882.
144. Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 879.
145. Id. at 885–86. Specifically, the court used the finding in the traditional injunction eBay test
under factors one and two.
146. Id. at 880.
147. Rich Gervase et al., Evolving SEP Jurisprudence and RAND Determinations in Microsoft v.
Motorola,
GLOBAL
IP
MATTERS
(Aug.
21,
2015),
https://www.globalipmatters.com/2015/08/21/evolving-sep-jurisprudence-and-rand-determinations-
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III. RAND FOR PRIVACY
This paper suggests RAND commitments are an aspect of intellectual
property law that would work well in the privacy law context. A privacy
RAND commitment would consist of the following: (1) companies using
consumer data would make a commitment to an SSO (discussed in
section (C)(1) below) to use consumer data only in reasonable and nondiscriminatory ways; (2) consumers would be able to see which
companies have made RAND commitments in order to inform their
choice of service provider; (3) the company and SSO would arrange for
some form of affirmative statement regarding the privacy practices of
the company in order to demonstrate the reasonableness of the
company’s practices; and (4) if a consumer, the FTC, or a consumer
protection agency felt a company had not honored its commitment (i.e.,
had unreasonable or discriminatory practices), the individual or group
could sue the company for breach of contract as a beneficiary of the
company’s original commitment to the SSO. Using RAND
commitments would allow courts to acknowledge consumers’ lack of
meaningful choice when deciding whether to let online companies use
their personal information. It would also allow for the development of
new industry standards for online data use, which could include
flexibility and tailoring based on company needs and industry
preferences, and allow consumers to bring claims as individuals or as a
class action when a company’s behavior becomes unreasonable.
A. Online Companies Impact Our Everyday Life
1. Online Companies Often Dominate Online Market Segments
What does it mean to have a market-dominant position, and why does
it matter? In the United States, an SEP holder has a duty to potential
licensees.148 In several other countries, such as Germany, companies
constitute SEP holders subject to SEP duties only if they have first
abused a market-dominant position.149 In other words, a company must
in-microsoft-v-motorola [https://perma.cc/24V3-G3Z3].
148. AIPPI SPECIAL COMM. PATENTS AND STANDARDS, AVAILABILITY OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
FOR FRAND-COMMITTED STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS 8 (2014), https://aippi.org/wpcontent/uploads/committees/222/Report222AIPPI+report+on+the+availability+of+injunctive+relief
+for+FRAND-committed+standard+essential+patentsEnglish.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UM2RGMCY].
149. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 102, Mar.
25, 1957, 2012 O.J. (C326) reads: “Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position
within the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
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hold a market-dominant position in order to become subject to SEP
licensing obligations. Under both definitions, having a “standard” or
abusing a market-dominant position is an acknowledgment that the SEPholder is in a position to make outrageous demands on any potential
licensee, which the licensee is forced to accept based on the ubiquity of
the patented technology within the industry.
In the realm of privacy, companies with market-dominant positions
are able to impose whatever terms they want on an individual, offering
their services on a “take it or leave it” basis, so consumers do not have a
legitimate choice in how their data is used. While online companies may
not be true “monopolies,” and still face competition within the market, it
is undeniable that many companies hold market-dominant positions.150
The top two search companies, Google and Microsoft, together take up
85.5% of the online search market.151 Facebook “owns” social
networking with 30% more market share than its nearest competitors,
Twitter and Reddit.152 While some market segments include more than
one company, those markets still tend to be “oligopolies,” containing
only a handful of major players, all with similar privacy practices.153 For
example, 50% of all Americans subscribe to Netflix, and 29% subscribe
to Amazon Prime.154 It is also important to note that many “competitors”
are not actually market substitutes, i.e., a user cannot simply exchange
their use of one company with another because the competitors are not
actually providing the same product or service. For example, only 58%
of Americans subscribe to any online streaming service, so the Netflix
subscription population necessarily includes at least 72% of the users
subscribing to Amazon Prime, making them complementary, rather than

internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.”
150. Given when market dominance is a measure of the strength of a brand, product, service, or
firm, relative to competitive offerings. Susan Athey & Armin Schmutzler, Investment and Market
Dominance, 32 RAND J. ECON. 1, 1–26 (2001).
151. Todd Bishop, Google’s Market Share Climbs in Latest U.S. Search Stats, GEEKWIRE (Jan.
15, 2014, 2:14 PM), http://www.geekwire.com/2014/googles-market-share-climbs-latest-u-s-searchstats/ [https://perma.cc/QRV3-SJ67].
152. Priit Kallas, Top 10 Social Networking Sites by Market Share Statistics [November 2017],
DREAMGROW (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.dreamgrow.com/top-10-social-networking-sites-marketshare-of-visits/ [https://perma.cc/QRV3-SJ67].
153. Daniel Altman, The New Monopolies, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 7, 2013, 3:45 PM),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/07/the_new_monopolies
[https://perma.cc/6Y5TQVKU].
154. Share of Consumers Who Have a Subscription to an On-Demand Video Service in the
United States in 2017, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/318778/subscription-basedvideo-streaming-services-usage-usa/ [https://perma.cc/S8Z8-SUGL].
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interchangeable, products.155 Therefore, a consumer looking to avoid
using one product may not have a reasonable alternative, meaning that,
from a practical standpoint, the company has a monopoly.
Even statistics underestimate the dominant positions of online
companies. Facebook’s market share is measured against companies like
YouTube, Twitter, Pinterest, and LinkedIn—companies with very
different functionality and value to the user.156 It is unlikely that people
tired of using Facebook would consider YouTube a meaningful
alternative to stay in touch with friends and family. Even the arguably
closest substitute to Facebook, LinkedIn, maintains a very different role
in the market—professional networking versus Facebook’s personal
networking.157 In the words of one writer, “no one expects . . . Skype to
take over from Twitter. Though the border incursions do keep dominant
firms on their toes, they have largely foundered as business ventures.”158
Just like Microsoft needed Motorola’s exact file format to create the Xbox, consumers “need” (or at least have few alternatives) to use
Facebook to communicate with friends and loved ones, and unlike
patented technology, possession of the “winning formula” doesn’t expire
after twenty years.159 Facebook will never have to release its code for
other companies to replicate.160 As mentioned earlier in this paper,
scholars have already taken note of the fact that “consumers . . . are
drawn to such firms because of their fine-tuning and personalization of
search and social network services.”161 Due to these industry dynamics,
there is no Target versus Wal-Mart or McDonalds versus Burger King
rivalry. Additionally, in these dominated online-market segments, the
choice to use a service is dependent on community choices and technical
compatibility. It does not reside solely with a consumer.
155. Id.
156. Updated Social Media Market Share—March 2013, VISUALLY, http://visual.ly/social-mediamarket-share-2013 [https://perma.cc/E2G5-VEAE].
157. Founded in 2004, Facebook’s mission is to “give people the power to build community and
bring the world closer together.” About, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/facebook/info
[https://perma.cc/SVH9-WXQF]. LinkedIn is “the world’s largest professional network with more
than 562 million users in more than 200 countries and territories worldwide.” About LinkedIn,
LINKEDIN, http://press.linkedin.com/about [https://perma.cc/S4ZM-QFUT].
158. Tim Wu, In the Grip of the New Monopolists, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 13, 2010, 12:01 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704635704575604993311538482
[https://perma.cc/7ASK-6V5V].
159. See supra section III.C.
160. Under the Uniform Trade Secret Act, trade secrets are protectable for as long as the
information is kept secret. See, e.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, supra note 70; WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 19.108.010 (West 2018).
161. Pasquale, supra note 103, at 1014–15.
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Consumers Have Little Control over What Online Services They
Use

Online companies also resemble “standards” in that users often have
little control over choosing a service. Just as a company who creates a
part for a phone manufacturer will need to adapt the electricity standard
the phone uses to ensure compatibility, consumers must use multiple
online services to participate in modern culture. For example, a student’s
school e-mail account is frequently provided through Gmail. His or her
work e-mail is frequently provided through Outlook.162 Facebook and
LinkedIn both use personal information for direct advertising: all his or
her family is on Facebook, and LinkedIn is how he or she communicates
with fellow alumni.163 While a user can try avoiding using geolocation to
get directions, sign-off of all social media, and use alternative internet
browsers—to do so essentially eliminates the usefulness of technology
developed over the past decade. All of the consumer’s daily life is
affected by technology, and there is no escape.
3.

Online Companies Have a Vastly Superior Bargaining Position in
Relation to Consumers

Because online services are so entangled with daily life, and given
corporate market dominance, consumers have no ability to negotiate the
terms of their relationship with service providers. In contrast to how
businesses are often able to negotiate data-protection terms with each
other,164 individual consumers are left in the “take it or leave it”
situation.165 As discussed earlier, in privacy law, consumer interests are
small and diffuse, so, in comparison with most forms of intellectual
property law, imbalance of power between negotiating parties is much

162. Outlook’s privacy standards and information gathered is governed by the Microsoft Online
Privacy statement. Microsoft Privacy Statement, MICROSOFT, http://privacy.microsoft.com/enus/fullnotice.mspx [https://perma.cc/2FCL-SYPN].
163. Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/ [https://perma.cc/82JPZ6PX];
Privacy
Policy,
LINKEDIN,
https://www.linkedin.com/legal/privacy-policy
[https://perma.cc/M4QS-S67F].
164. While specific negotiations are generally confidential and hard to cite directly, the practice
of negotiating data security clauses in a business-to-business context is so common that IAPP
releases “standard” contract clauses for integration into contracts. Dana B. Rosenfeld & Alysa
Zeltzer Hutnik, Data Security Contract Clauses for Service Provider Arrangements (Pro-customer),
PRACTICAL
LAW
COMPANY
(2011),
https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/Rosenfeld_Hutnik_Contract-clauses_Serviceprovider.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8J5-K2CJ].
165. Pasquale, supra note 103, at 1014–15.
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greater.166 SEPs create similar problems; the only difference is the
source of the power. SEP holders benefit from a government-granted
market-dominant position while online companies benefit from propriety
technology.167 In the data-use context, it is unclear whether a company’s
use of personal data is actually necessary to its business models, because
consumers do not have the ability to negotiate as a group and gain
insight into why a business wishes to gather said data.168
B.

RAND Commitments Could Accomplish Real Privacy Objectives

1.

RAND Commitments Would Facilitate Accountability

As discussed in previous sections, visibility into company data
practices is a necessary prerequisite to setting standards for data use.
However, companies often will not provide full transparency into their
data cycle, due to both commercial and security concerns. A RAND
system would necessarily require insight into data use and sharing in
order to understand whether a company’s practices were reasonable, but
could do so in a more practical way than pure public disclosure. RAND
commitments would require companies to explain and justify their
information use as reasonable, both from a business perspective and
from the perspective of the consumer. Even this simple requirement
would drastically change the landscape of privacy law by giving
consumers a better view into how companies are actually using their
data, and helping them understand the true trade-off between utility and
privacy.169 In addition, a RAND system would present better practical
methods for companies to disclose the details of their data use than the
present “privacy policy” disclosure because it would provide avenues for
disclosure without also disclosing proprietary information to the public
at large. The disclosure could be made both proactively and
166. LESSIG, supra note 67, at 200.
167. Patents are generally defined as government granted monopolies. A Patent Is a Government
Granted
Monopoly
on
an
Invention,
LAWTEACHER
(May
25,
2018),
http://www.lawteacher.net/commercial-law/essays/a-patent-is-a-government-granted-monopoly-onan-invention-commercial-law-essay.php [https://perma.cc/9WZT-TL5E].
168. Pasquale, supra note 103, at 1014–15.
169. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 60
(2012), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-reportprotecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y2J6-WQ5Y]. (“Commission staff called on industry to make privacy statements
clearer, shorter, and more standardized; give consumers reasonable access to their data; and
undertake consumer education efforts to improve consumers’ understanding of how companies
collect, use, and share their data.”).

Wilka - Privacy Commitments - Copyedited_BM (1).docx (Do Not Delete)

92

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ONLINE

8/17/18 2:16 PM

[Vol. 93:63

retroactively. Proactively, companies could disclose via a periodic audit
by, or periodic reporting to, the SSO, similar to current FTC
enforcement action requirements and/or business-to-business (B2B)
contractually-mandated security audits, the results of which could be
then relayed to consumers without the specific proprietary formulas or
names of business partners. Retroactively, companies would have to
respond to discovery requests in connection with the created causes of
action, in which case trade secrets could be redacted from the
information provided to the plaintiff. Both avenues for disclosure could
make use of processes, like third-party audits and periodic reporting, that
online companies already have in place for non-privacy related business
processes.
2.

RAND Commitments Are Workable for the Industry and Provide
Flexibility While Still Allowing for Regulation

One of the biggest complaints from the tech industry, particularly in
regard to enacting new, broader, privacy law, is that regulation is stifling
and cannot move quickly enough to address changes in technology. Each
year, technology evolves at a faster rate. While privacy laws in the
United States have been adapted to effectively regulate specific
concerns—for example, with children’s privacy through the Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)—the United States has failed to
enact broader federal protections that would curb online companies’ use
of data. In fact, the United States has mainly focused on notice to
consumers, rather than focusing on the data use itself. RAND
commitments would change industry norms by allowing standards to
adapt year over year, soliciting input from the industry as well as
regulators and the public, and reflecting ongoing developments in
technology.
Similar systems are already in place in the tech industry to address
other concerns. Founded in 1996, the Interactive Advertising Bureau
(IAB) in the last two decades has established itself as the creator of the
default advertising terms for online ad placement through insertion
order, based on the input of its members.170 Hundreds of leading media
organizations are now IAB members and rely on the IAB terms, either in
their original form or with company specific addendums. This model
demonstrates that even in the presence of competitive forces, technology
companies can collaborate on “guidelines” for addressing shared
concerns. Additionally, as discussed in the previous section, most of the
170. About IAB, IAB, https://www.iab.com/our-story/ [https://perma.cc/Q33U-VT7T].
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transparency requirements needed to make a RAND system work are
already utilized by data collectors to address concerns in other business
segments. Thus, while the use of audits, proactive reporting, and
responses to discovery requests may add a marginal administrative
burden, they would not require businesses to make enormous outlays for
new systems.
Companies also have incentives to make this system work. At a base
level, given the recent public relations exposure from privacy violations,
companies are looking for methods of “signaling” their respect for
consumer privacy. RAND commitments would include tangible actions
the market has the ability to reward, enabling both consumer
participation in privacy law and reputational benefits enhancing
company value. Signaling has a “virtuous-circle quality: as more people
signal . . . as a positive reputation signal, the positive reputation signal
grows in strength.”171 There are also very practical incentives to enacting
effective self-regulatory systems. Following the introduction of the EU
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), approved in 2016, and
enforceable starting May 25, 2018, technology companies with an
international presence will have to overhaul their current privacy
practices.172 In light of the changes, the industry needs to demonstrate
that an industry-run regulatory system can work, and ideally work better,
than new federal and state statutory schemes. This way, they could steer
the federal government, or progressive individual states, away from
implementing legislation with burdensome requirements similar to
GDPR, like the newly-enacted statute in California173 which technology
companies are already trying to change due to its stringent
requirements.174 Government systems may also find that a RAND
system addresses their concerns better than additional legislation would.
By allowing for private rights of action, FTC follow-on enforcement,
171. Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation Under High-Penalty Regimes, 44
CONN. L. REV. 675, 683 (2012).
172. Megan Leonhardt & Alix Langone, You’ve Probably Received a Ton of Privacy Policy
Emails This Week. Here’s What’s Changing, TIME: MONEY (May 24, 2018),
http://time.com/money/5254754/gdpr-privacy-policy-rules/ [https://perma.cc/QE4C-YP7D].
173. Daisuke Wakabayashi, California Passes Sweeping Law to Protect Online Privacy, N.Y.
TIMES (June 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/technology/california-online-privacylaw.html [https://perma.cc/Q4VU-FEKX].
174. Derek Hawkins, The Cybersecurity 202: Big Tech Is Going After California’s New Privacy
Law,
WASH.
POST:
POWERPOST
(July
3,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-cybersecurity-202/2018/07/03/thecybersecurity-202-big-tech-is-going-after-california-s-new-privacylaw/5b3a4e081b326b3348addc76/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1a4c27be5736
[https://perma.cc/9UG9-C7WR].
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and industry reporting, RAND commitments include avenues for
governmental enforcement and governmental oversight, but also provide
more efficient regulation by including the self-regulatory component.
3.

RAND Commitments Support Concrete Enforcement and Remedies

RAND commitments would create several mechanisms for ensuring
companies are incentivized to comply with the RAND requirements.
First, as discussed in previous sections, breaking a RAND commitment
(in the patent setting) is considered a breach of contract. Similarly, in the
privacy world, RAND commitments would provide better mechanisms
for class actions than current statutory rights of action because a breachof-contract claim based on a company’s commitments to privacy would
be uniform across the entire class of consumers in most cases, and not
subject to mandatory arbitration or damage limitations present in most
“click-throughs.”175 Judges would also have more leeway to decide
whether a company was being unreasonable based on its conduct.176 This
structure would incentivize class-action attorneys to take on
contingency-fee cases, lessening the monetary burden on plaintiffs.
Second, RAND commitments introduce a self-regulatory component
within the industry, because a violation of RAND commitments could be
considered an “unfair business practice,” which would allow other
businesses (likely competitors) to bring a suit against a RAND-violating
company based on the legal theory that the violation negatively affected
their ability to compete in the market. This type of remedy already exists
in other legal spaces. For example, in California, including a noncompete or no-hire clause in a contract can be challenged by a
competitor as an unfair business practice.177
Third, RAND commitments would allow for enforcement by the SSO
itself, which could investigate based on consumer complaints and
175. Class actions, in recent years, have generally had problems meeting uniformity requirements
due to certain Supreme Court rulings, and this problem has also applied in the privacy context. See
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). For an example of where a privacy violation
was uniform across a class and therefore met the requirements of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, see In re
Google Referrer Header Privacy Litig., No. 5:10-CV-04809 EJD, 2014 WL 1266091, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 26, 2014) (“Here, Plaintiffs contend the commonality requirement is met because the
claims of all class members arise from one critical allegation: that Defendant’s system-wide practice
and policy of storage and disclosure of their search query information was unlawful.”).
176. See supra section III.C. for an example of how judges can consider reasonableness in RAND
commitments.
177. Spencer Hamer, Non-Compete Clauses in California, LAW JOURNAL NEWSLETTERS (Jan.
2017), http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/sites/lawjournalnewsletters/2017/01/01/non-competeclauses-in-california/?slreturn=20180513185256 [https://perma.cc/Q7FJ-UCNP].
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detection of wrongdoing from reviewing periodic reports. Relatedly,
RAND commitments would benefit current regulatory bodies like the
FTC. The FTC can already investigate based on deceptive business
practices and has issued guidance on “reasonable” privacy in its report,
“Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change,” which
emphasizes three guiding principles: (1) privacy by design; (2)
simplified consumer choice; and (3) greater transparency.178 All three
principles are furthered by a RAND approach. Additionally, the RAND
system would address another problem in the current privacy regulatory
space—the FTC’s finite resources. By creating new private causes of
action and B2B reporting, a RAND system would lower the pressure on
the FTC to investigate every large technology company, while
simultaneously leveraging their investigatory resources through the
added reporting incentives and transparency requirements.
4.

RAND Commitments Would Address Bargaining Power
Imbalances

By creating the enforcement mechanisms and enhanced transparency
discussed in previous sections, RAND commitments strengthen
consumer bargaining power by amalgamating diffuse interests into a
collective public good. The result is a relationship that more closely
resembles two organizations with comparable size, rather than one large
organization against a mass of individuals.
Some research has already been done to demonstrate that private
companies respond to market pressures in the realm of privacy law.179
Currently, those pressures appear to come from competitors and
statutory sources, not from consumers.180 By enabling competitor
reporting and supporting regulatory enforcement, RAND commitments
would use the pressure of competitors and government bodies to back
consumer rights. In conjunction with the current change in public
sentiment regarding privacy rights, RAND commitments should enable
consumers to exert real influence on industry practices for personal data
use.

178. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 169, at 22–71.
179. Kusum L. Ailawadi, Donald R. Lehmann & Scott A. Neslin, Market Response to a Major
Policy Change in the Marketing Mix: Learning from Procter and Gamble’s Value Pricing Strategy,
65 J. MARKETING 44 (2001).
180. See Turow, supra note 4.
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Organizations, for-profit and non-profit, big and small, have already
started trying to establish privacy standards for online companies, and to
hold those companies accountable for their actions. For-profit
organizations like TRUSTe have tried to create self-regulatory systems
to signal respect for privacy, but have run into obstacles both in adoption
and maintaining reputational integrity.181 Non-profit organizations, such
as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), and the Electronic Privacy Information Center
(EPIC) have made it their mission to try to protect online consumer
privacy.182 The non-profit organizations have helped plaintiffs bring
consumer privacy lawsuits, provide input for proposed legislation, and
issue advisory reports.183 Many companies considering a large change in
their privacy policies may, at some point, consult the ACLU.184
However, their relationships with technology companies are generally
more adversarial than collaborative. That is not to say that such

181. TRUSTe Settles FTC Charges It Deceived Consumers Through Its Privacy Seal Program,
FED.
TRADE
COMM’N
(Nov.
17,
2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2014/11/truste-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-consumers-through-its
[https://perma.cc/5EME-WAB6].
182. See About, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/about [https://perma.cc/9CC9LJ24]. (“Founded in 1990, EFF champions user privacy, free expression, and innovation through
impact litigation, policy analysis, grassroots activism, and technology development.”); Privacy &
Technology, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty
[https://perma.cc/2U8U-5BY7] (“The ACLU works to expand the right to privacy, increase the
control individuals have over their personal information, and ensure civil liberties are enhanced
rather than compromised by technological innovation.”); About EPIC, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR.,
http://epic.org/epic/about.html [https://perma.cc/G2K2-K8VH] (“EPIC . . . was established . . . to
focus public attention on emerging privacy and civil liberties issues and to protect privacy, freedom
of expression, and democratic values in the information age.”).
183. See, e.g., ACLU Letter to the Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee Regarding Its
Report “The Use of RFID for Human Identification”, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/letter/aclu-letter-data-privacy-and-integrity-advisory-committee-regarding-itsreport-use-rfid-human [https://perma.cc/46BD-92FW]; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ENFORCING
PRIVACY: BUILDING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS TO PROTECT PRIVACY IN THE FACE OF NEW
TECHNOLOGY
AND
GOVERNMENT
POWERS
(2009),
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/ACLU_Report_-_Enforcing_Privacy_2009.pdf
[https://perma.cc/89Y2-JLMV];
Apple
v.
Does,
ELEC.
FRONTIER
FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/cases/apple-v-does [https://perma.cc/5PAK-Y4V5].
184. See, e.g., Theo Francis, Strange Bedfellows on Health Privacy: ACLU & Microsoft, WALL
STREET
J.:
HEALTH
BLOG
(Oct.
19,
2007,
3:12
PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2007/10/19/strange-bedfellows-on-health-privacy-aclu-microsoft/ (last
visited June 11, 2018).
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organizations do not play an important, indeed necessary, role in holding
technology companies accountable for their actions, but their mission
often necessitates fighting for idealism rather than pursuing
compromised practicality.
To maximize buy-in while still protecting organizational integrity and
concrete changes to privacy practices, a RAND SSO must be seen as
independent from, but responsive to, industry members. In the realm of
patent law, that role is filled by no single organization that holds all
RAND commitments. Instead, multiple SSOs like the American Society
of Mechanical Engineering (ASME) or the IEEE, became the recipient
of said commitments.185 In the privacy field, there are already
organizations that could be viewed as functional equivalents. For
example, the International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP),
a non-profit formed in 2000, has become an industry leader in certifying
individuals with the requisite knowledge to be considered “Privacy
Professionals.”186 The IAPP also partners with corporate sponsors to
host industry collaboration on important privacy topics and could be an
appropriate recipient for initial privacy RAND commitments.187 SOC
and SOC 2, and related auditing, are self-regulatory standards created to
support and verify responsible information security practices.188
Alternatively, the industry could elect to create a new SSO dedicated to
forming and enforcing RAND commitments.
One of the best recommenders for a RAND system, and selfregulatory models generally, is that they are adaptable. If one
organization proves to be unable to effectively regulate and balance
industry and public interests, a new organization can take its place
without having to repeal any existing systems. In fact, allowing for
multiple standards organizations allows for faster adoption by: (a)
providing options for companies with specific preferences; and (b)
allowing competition to clarify an optimal approach.
2. Expanding on Existing Legislation, in Word and in Deed
Once a privacy RAND SSO is selected or created, the question
remains as to what privacy RAND standards would look like in practice.
185. See, e.g., Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 US 556, 572 (1982).
186. IAPP Mission and Background, IAPP, https://iapp.org/about/mission-and-background/
[https://perma.cc/7PK4-BBLC].
187. Id.
188. SOC for Service Organizations: Information for Service Organizations, AICPA,
https://www.aicpa.org/interestareas/frc/assuranceadvisoryservices/serviceorganizationsmanagement.html [https://perma.cc/XXP5-T7KT].
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As discussed above, the FTC has already issued “guiding principles” for
privacy: (a) privacy by design; (b) simplified consumer choice; and (c)
greater transparency. Additionally, the FTC has already issued some
guidance on “unreasonable” practices by prosecuting and entering into
enforcement actions in particularly egregious cases.
To create RAND privacy commitments, the SSO, and its industry
members, could build upon the FTC’s foundation, and the foundation of
other legislation,189 to go through a drafting and comment process to
build policies addressing the privacy concerns at every stage of the data
life cycle. After said policies are finalized and implemented, consumers
can view the commitments put forth by a company and bring a breachof-contract claim (if they believe the policies are unreasonable) at any
point before, during, or after they commence using the service. The
commitment, and the right to bring a RAND related claim, is not
sacrificed if the consumer uses the service. From the company’s
perspective, the requirements and industry norms become clearer over
time. If a customer brings a claim against the businesses’ policies or
actions that seemingly violate its commitments, a judge can issue a
concrete ruling that will apply not just to that company, but to all other
RAND-committed companies as well. As a result, the company would
only have to litigate once, and consumers would all essentially be held to
the ruling. If the judge ruled against it, the company would have clarity
in terms of what aspects of its policies were unreasonable, analysis often
lacking in the current legal environment. Therefore, the company would
have legal certainty about its position for as long as it chooses to stay
within its current personal data practices and policies and continue its
non-discriminatory use of data. The judicial mechanism would provide
an incentive to the company to continue using a simplified consumer
choice model.
The system would also enable implementation of some of the more
novel approaches to privacy rights. What if a machine learning
algorithm could be used to anonymize data to the point that it could not
be re-identified, categorizing users into effective segment profiles, rather
than using individualized targeting? What if an algorithm could be
created to effectively weed out falsified articles, or advertisers with
inappropriate content? Technical advancements with the mission of
189. Other legislation includes current state laws in privacy-progressive states like Massachusetts,
Illinois, and California, and industry-specific legislation like COPPA and HIPAA. LEUAN JOLLY,
DATA PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: OVERVIEW, WESTLAW: PRACTICAL LAW
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I02064fbd1cb611e38578f7ccc38dcbee/View/FullText.html?c
ontextData=(sc.Default)&transitionType=Default&firstPage=true (last visited June 24, 2018).
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protecting user privacy are already theorized. One set of academics
analyzed a new machine-learning system called Chiron which attempts
to anonymize training data for machine learning.190 If an algorithm
works better than a policy, SSOs could require or recommend the
technology as a best practice.
To summarize, a RAND system will allow regulation to exist in a
space between a mere principle and a stiff exacting requirement,
allowing for the development of an applicable body of case law while
still preserving the ability to adapt over time. Additionally, it does not
have to hold to a pre-conceived idea of what a secure private system
looks like, and can therefore examine new behavioral and technical
solutions, perhaps managing to better predict and manage new privacy
issues before they affect the public.
D.

Concerns with a RAND Approach

1.

Making Assertions Concrete

The first potential critique of a RAND system is that companies will
not be forced to create clearer standards through RAND commitments
than they already have under their opaque privacy policies. This paper
argues that RAND commitments will help companies move towards
clearer, more concrete commitments in two ways. First, if a company
has clear standards, those standards will provide a litigation advantage
and, as discussed above, will drastically decrease the company’s overall
litigation volume. For example, it would be much easier for a company
to demonstrate the reasonableness of a data retention period of six
months compared to a commitment that it was keeping data as long as
reasonably necessary, because one is inherently easier to measure than
the other, and does not require proof that retention was reasonably
necessary. Second, even if only a small number of companies initially
steer towards clearer commitments as a way to avoid litigation, their
commitments will help create industry standards. In response to the
development of standards, other companies will begin making their
policies clearer as a way of ensuring they are not seen as a target for
litigation or press that could hurt their public image. Essentially, the
implementation of a RAND regime will result in a self-improving
system; early adapters build the base standards, and in doing so,
demonstrate the positive benefits of enacting said standards. Eventually,
190. See generally Tyler Hunt et al., Chiron: Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning as a Service,
(Mar. 15, 2018), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1803.05961.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BR3-GAHF].

ARXIV

Wilka - Privacy Commitments - Copyedited_BM (1).docx (Do Not Delete)

100

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ONLINE

8/17/18 2:16 PM

[Vol. 93:63

those who refrain from making RAND commitments will face clear
operational, legal, and reputational disadvantages compared to others
within the industry.
2.

Legally Demonstrating that a Company Violated Its Commitments

The next concern critics may raise is the difficulty of proving that a
company violated its privacy commitments. The solution to this problem
lies in shifting the burden to a company to show that its policies were
reasonable, once the consumer has pled basic facts demonstrating that
the average consumer could find the practices unreasonable. Proving that
a company violated its commitments will also be easier to prove
because, as discussed above, RAND commitments inherently define
standards over time in measurable ways in contrast to the muddied
waters of the present legal schema. The clearer the assertion, the less
difficult it is for a plaintiff to support said assertions through discovery.
Additionally, as privacy commitments would be consistent across all
consumers, a named plaintiff could represent the reasonable consumer,
allowing for a unified class more capable of bringing a successful class
action.
3.

Incentivizing Companies to Begin Making RAND Commitments

The final critique of this approach is that companies might not make
RAND privacy commitments because they want privacy standards to
remain unclear, preventing the system from gaining traction. This
argument was brought up when RAND commitments were first
presented in patent law. The argument was refuted fairly quickly when
Samsung, Apple, Microsoft, Motorola, and many other companies chose
voluntarily to make RAND patent commitments.191 In fact, RAND
policy (although initially present only within the United States) has
already been accepted throughout much of Europe and Asia.192 The
benefits to adopters—given the intraoperative nature of the market and
incentivized commitments—created an industry norm of SEP holders

191. See generally Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012); Apple, Inc. v.
Samsung Electronics Co., 678 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
192. Michael
Frohlich,
FRAND
and
Injunctive
Relief,
AIPPI
(July
2012),
https://www.aippi.org/enews/2012/edition25/Michael_Frohlich.html
[https://perma.cc/9WEM6ZDN]; Florian Mueller, UK Judge Does Not Consider EU Court Case a Reason to Stay FRAND
Rate-Setting
and
Damages
Cases,
FOSS
PATENTS
(May
8,
2013),
http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/05/uk-judge-does-not-consider-eu-court.html
[https://perma.cc/BVG4-QSTW].
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using RAND licensing.193 Those who adopt RAND privacy
commitments obtain multitudinous benefits: clearer legal expectations
and standards, lower litigation volume, and a level playing field within
the industry. While there is no way of knowing with absolute certainty
that privacy RAND commitments would be used by companies until the
option is presented, the investment needed to set up the framework is
minimal given the self-regulatory nature of a RAND system.
Additionally, as discussed in previous sections, the digital services
industry is currently incentivized to create its own concrete obligations
to avoid rigid and inconsistent regulation being enacted by applicable
governing authorities. RAND commitments would allow technology
companies to do what they do best, find innovative business and
technical solutions to solve consumer concerns.
CONCLUSION
Many scholars have attempted to place privacy protections into the
framework of intellectual property, but thus far their proposals have
been hard to operationalize. One explanation for this difficulty is the
common feature of the proposals—providing a property right to the
consumer, who as an individual is unable to exercise the right in a
meaningful way. In contrast to other intellectual property approaches,
RAND commitments inherently consider inequity in bargaining
positions and compensate for the imbalance. RAND commitments are
also self-regulatory, allowing rapid and flexible adoption. The principle
inducement for using RAND commitments is that the framework
benefits both companies and consumers. The consumer is given a clear
and demonstrable cause of action based on reasonable expectation; the
company is given a flexible but consistent standard. Additionally,
outside stakeholders have the opportunity to provide input and suggest
standards for the industry. While there is no guarantee that RAND
commitments would create meaningful legal reform, the low cost of
implementation and self-regulatory nature means that adoption has a
very low chance of causing any detrimental effects to either the law or
the industry. For these reasons, the implementation of RAND
commitments should be considered in the context of privacy law.

193. Jennifer Vanderhart, F/RAND – The Economic Incentives and a Discussion of Microsoft v.
Motorola,
MONDAQ
(Sept.
12,
2013),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/260112/Patent/FRand+The+Economic+Incentives+And+A
+Discussion+Of+Microsoft+V+Motorola [https://perma.cc/Z8FB-BNFX].
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